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Introduction
Canadian courts have accepted mandatory arbitration clauses as
presumptively enforceable unless there is legislation that precludes their
application. This position was confirmed by the Supreme Court in Seidel
v. TEL US Communications Inc.1
In Heller v. Uber Technologies Inc., the Ontario Court of Appeal
considered an arbitration clause in the context of legislation following
the approach in Seidel, but the Court also undertook an unconscionability
analysis. 2 Reviewing a motion that was granted to stay a class action
proceeding in favour of an arbitration clause, the Court unanimously held
that the clause was invalid on two separate grounds. First, the arbitration
clause amounted to an illegal contracting out of the Employment Standards
Act.3 This is an application of the core principle from Seidel. Second,
the Court held that the arbitration clause was unconscionable. 4 This is a
*
Editor, JD Candidate 2019. My thanks to Dean Camille Cameron for her valuable writing advice
and insight, and to Professor Kim Brooks and Imogen Phipps-Burton for their helpful comments.
1. 2011 SCC 15 at para 2 [Seidel]. Note that Ontario and Quebec have consumer protection
legislation that precludes pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clauses. Alberta requires ministerial
approval of consumer arbitration clauses. British Columbia has one consumer provision that the
Supreme Court held to preclude arbitration of public interest claims, see ibid at paras 25, 40.
2.
3.
4.

2019 ONCA 1 [Heller].
Ibid at paras 23-51; Employment StandardsAct, 2000, SO 2000, c 41, s 5(1) [ESA].
Heller,supra note 2 at paras 52-73.
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significant development because it is the first time a Canadian court has
held an arbitration clause invalid on the basis of unconscionability.
In the first part of this case comment, I provide context to the Court's
principal analysis. I briefly describe the facts and the motion judge's
decision. I then discuss the competence-competence principle, which is
a preliminary jurisdiction issue. In part two, I explain the two grounds
used by the Court to invalidate the mandatory arbitration clause in Uber
drivers' contracts. Finally, I argue in part three that the reasoning from
this decision can be used to hold other arbitration clauses unconscionable
where they prevent class actions involving individually low-value claims.
I.

Context

1. Facts
Mr. Heller lives in Ontario and works delivering food for Uber Eats, which
is a food delivery service owned by Uberi He is the representative plaintiff
in a proposed class action against Uber. The class includes drivers for both
food delivery services and transportation services offered by Uber. The
proposed class action argues, among other things, that drivers for Uber
are employees and that Uber has violated the ESA. It claims damages of
$400 million for benefits protected by the ESA, including minimum wage,
6
overtime, and vacation pay.
Mr. Heller's ability to proceed with the class action turns on his
acceptance of a services agreement. When drivers log in to the Uber App
for the first time, they have to accept that agreement, which contains an
arbitration clause. The clause states that the agreement is governed by the
laws of the Netherlands, all disputes must go through mediation prior to
arbitration, and the place of arbitration is the Netherlands.'
Uber applied for a motion to stay the class action in favour of
arbitration, in accordance with the services agreement. The motion was
granted.8 The motion judge held that the plain language of the ESA does not
preclude arbitration. He also held that whether Mr. Heller is an employee
is a complex issue of mixed fact and law, which should be decided by
the arbitrator at first instance according to the competence-competence
principle. 9 The motion judge rejected the unconscionability argument.

5. Ibid, n 1. As the Ontario Court of Appeal did in Heller, I use "Uber" for simplicity. Although
there are several subsidiaries involved, it does not affect the analysis in the case.
6.
Ibid at paras 2-4, 59.
7.
8.
9.

Ibid at paras 5-11.
Heller v Uber Technologies Inc, 2018 ONSC 1690.
Ibid at paras 51-66.
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Although there was inequality of bargaining power, the agreement was
not unfair."0
2. The competence-competenceprinciple
A preliminary issue in the interpretation of arbitration clauses is the
competence-competence principle, which means that arbitrators have
the jurisdiction to decide their own jurisdiction. In Seidel, the Supreme
Court confirmed the general rule that challenges to jurisdiction should be
decided at first instance by the arbitrator. The exceptions to this rule are
questions of law, and questions of mixed law and fact where the facts only
require consideration of documentary evidence on record."1
The Ontario Court ofAppeal held that there was no issue ofjurisdiction
in this case because the clause, if valid, would apply to any dispute
between a driver and Uber. Validity refers to whether the clause itself
is legally enforceable. Applicability refers to whether the clause applies
to the dispute in question. 12 The Court apparently views jurisdiction in
terms of whether the clause is applicable, and validity as distinct from
jurisdiction. The Court concluded that both the ESA question and the
unconscionability issue were questions of validity.13 It is unclear why the
Court did not hold that the ESA issue was a question of law and therefore
an exception to the competence-competence principle. This would have
been more consistent with the reasoning in Seidel, where the Supreme
Court held that interpreting whether a statute applied was a question of law
since the facts were undisputed.14 In Heller, the fact that Uber drivers are
employees was presumed for the purpose of the motion, so the reasoning
from Seidel could have been used.15
Whether the Court intended to or not, drawing a distinction between
applicability and validity in this manner increases potential scrutiny of
arbitration clauses. Once validity is in question, courts can decide whether
the clause stands even when there are questions of mixed law and fact
where the facts extend past consideration of documentary evidence,
which goes beyond the existing exception. In other words, even if the
Court did not presume that Mr. Heller was an employee, it would still

10.
11.

Ibidat paras 67-79.
Seidel, supra note 1 at para 66, citing Dell Computer Corp v Union des consommateurs, 2007

SCC 34 at paras 84-85 [Dell].
12. Historically, there has been some debate as to what jurisdiction includes in the context of the
competence-competence principle. See Dell, supra note 11 at paras 164-166 (where the dissent
discusses the concepts of applicability and validity).
13.
14.
15.

Heller,supra note 2 at paras 38-40.
Supra note 1 at para 30.
Supra note 2 at para 27.
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have the jurisdiction to make a preliminary employee determination prior
to deciding whether the arbitration clause is valid.
The Court dismissed Uber's argument that validity should be decided
by the arbitrator. This is consistent with section 7(2) of the ArbitrationAct.
However, section 17(1) provides that an arbitrator may decide their own
jurisdiction, including the validity of the clause itself.16 The Court could
have been clearer by saying that, although an arbitrator may determine
the validity of the clause (e.g., if a party decides to argue validity before
an arbitrator instead of a court), courts retain the jurisdiction to determine
validity in an application to stay proceedings in favour of arbitration.
II.The Court ofAppeal s analysis of the arbitrationclause
1. Contractingout of the Employment Standards Act
The first issue before the Court of Appeal was whether the arbitration
clause represented an illegal contracting out of the Employment Standards
Act. For the purpose of the motion, the Court presumed that Mr. Heller can
17
prove what he pleads, which is that he is an employee of Uber.
Section 5(1) of the ESA prohibits an employer from contracting out of,
or waiving, an employment standard.18 The Court held that the arbitration
clause contracted out of the complaint mechanism to the Ministry of
Labour. A complaint triggers an investigation by an Employment Standards
Officer.19 The Court determined that the investigative process was an
employment standard, in part because the Officer can order an employer
to pay wages. 2' This means that the arbitration clause illegally contracts
out of the ESA. The clause is therefore invalid under section 7(2) of the
ArbitrationAct.21 The Court ofAppeal's analysis in interpreting provisions
of the ESA consistent with its purpose to protect employees follows the
Supreme Court's approach in Seidel, where the Court held that consumer
protection legislation should be interpreted broadly since its purpose is to
protect consumers. 22
The Court of Appeal held that the arbitration clause violates section
5(1) even though a civil action is being pursued, which precludes the right
to file a complaint under the ESA. 23 This is because there could be Uber
16.
17.
18.
19.

ArbitrationAct, 1991, SO 1991, c 17, ss 7(2), 17(1).
Heller,supra note 2 at para 27.
Supra note 3, s 5(1).
Ibid, s 96(1).

20. Ibid, ss 1(1), 103 (employment standard is defined as "a requirement or prohibition under this
Act that applies to an employer for the benefit of an employee"). Heller, supra note 2 at paras 35-36.
21.
22.
23.

Supra note 16, s 7(2).
Heller,supra note 2 at paras 37; Seidel, supranote 1 at paras 33-37.
Supra note 3, ss 5(1), 96(1), 98.
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drivers who are not part of the civil action but who are also subject to the
arbitration clause.24 This argument is likely where this part of the decision
is vulnerable to being overturned. If drivers filed complaints under the
ESA, then it would be clear that the arbitration clause contracts out of the
ESA. It could be argued that it was not the legislature's intent that civil
actions should be protected under the ESA considering that civil actions
remove the right to file a complaint.
Perhaps because of this potential weakness, the Court included policy
arguments that support its position. For example, the Court reviewed the
benefits of class proceedings, including the fact that there would be a
public decision on which others can rely. In contrast, the arbitration clause
would allow neither a class determination nor a public finding." The
Court concluded that determining whether Uber drivers are employees
is an important issue that should be determined by an Ontario court.26
Although these are compelling arguments, they go beyond Seidel because
the Supreme Court was clear that arbitration clauses are enforceable in the
absence of legislation that precludes them.2" In TELUS Communications
Inc. v. Wellman, which was decided after Heller, the Supreme Court
reiterated its position that policy arguments should not be considered in
statutory analysis beyond trying to interpret the legislature's intent.2"
2. Unconscionability
Few Canadian cases have examined unconscionability in the context of
arbitration clauses. Two lower court decisions involving motions to stay
class action proceedings in favour of arbitration show an early divide. In
Hurasv. PrimericaFinancialServicesLtd., the motion judge noted in obiter
that the arbitration clause was invalid on the basis of unconscionability
because it would preclude claims that would not be brought individually
due to their small size. 29 The Court of Appeal affirmed the motion judge's
decision but expressly avoided the issue of unconscionability.3" In Kanitz
v. Rogers Cable Inc., Nordheimer J., who also wrote the Court of Appeal
decision in Heller, held that the bargain was not unfair because there was

24.

Heller,supra note 2 at paras 42-43.

25.

Ibid at para 44.

26.

Ibid at para 50, citing Douez v Facebook Inc, 2017 SCC 33 at paras 58-60 [Douez] (where the

Supreme Court concluded that a statutory privacy tort claim should be decided by a B.C. court).
27.
28.
29.
30.

Supra note 1 at para 2.
2019 SCC 19 at paras 77-80 [Wellman].
58 OR (3d) 299 at paras 36-50, 2002 CarswellOnt 628 (WL Can).
55 OR (3d) 449 atpam 20, 2001 CanLII 17321 (CA).
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no evidence of costs to the consumer and no evidence that any consumer
was deterred from bringing a claim because of the arbitration clause.3"
The Court of Appeal noted in Heller that the test for unconscionability
in Canada is not clear.32 B.C. courts have used atwo-part test: 1) imbalance
ofbargaining power and 2) unfair bargain. 33Abella J. usedthis test in Douez;
however, her opinion was a concurring judgment (the majority decided the
case on different grounds).34 The Ontario Court ofAppeal has used a fourpart test that includes the two steps from the B.C. test, in addition to a
lack of independent legal advice and the powerful party knowingly taking
advantage of the weaker party.35 The Court did not determine whether
Douez changed the test for unconscionability in Ontario because it held
that the clause was unconscionable under either test. 6
The Court applied the four-part test to the facts. First, the arbitration
clause is substantially unfair because it requires the claimant to pay
significant up-front costs of $14,500. This does not include legal, travel, and
other expenses. Also, the claimant must arbitrate their claim individually
in a foreign jurisdiction. Second, Mr. Heller did not receive legal advice
prior to entering into the agreement. Third, there is significant inequality
of bargaining power between Mr. Heller and Uber. Finally, the Court
inferred that Uber knew and intended to use the clause to gain advantage
at the expense of their drivers, who are vulnerable parties.37
The test for unconscionability is not a major issue for mandatory
arbitration clauses in contracts of adhesion because the two extra steps will
not generally be determinative. First, there is unlikely to be independent
legal advice. As the Court noted, even if there was such advice, the
contractual terms are not negotiable. Second, it can be inferred that the
powerful party sought to take advantage of the vulnerable party, given
the existence of the other parts of the test.38 However, in the event a court
does not make such an inference, the burden would be on the less powerful
party to prove that the company knew that they were taking advantage of
the unfair bargaining power. This could compound the existing imbalance
of power. On balance, the two-step test is preferable.

31.
32.
33.
34.

58 OR (3d) 299 at paras 42-49, 2002 CanLII 49415 (SC) [Kanitz].
Supra note 2 at paras 60-61.
Morrison v Coast Finance Ltd, 55 DLR (2d) 710, 1965 CanLII 493 (BCCA).
Supra note 26 at paras 47-50, 115-117.

35.

Heller,supra note 2 at para 60, citing Titus v William F Cooke EnterprisesInc, 2007 ONCA

573 at para 38.
36.
37.
38.

Heller,supra note 2 at paras 62.
Ibidat para 68.
Ibid
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III. Unconscionabilityand the significance ofHeller
1. On a narrow reading, this case is limited by its facts
This decision is significant because it establishes unconscionability as
a basis to invalidate mandatory arbitration clauses. Without legislative
changes and with a potentially increasing number of contract workers,39
it will be left to courts to protect the rights of weaker parties. This is a
particularly important issue for independent contractors, employees where
employment legislation does not preclude arbitration, and consumers
where consumer protection legislation does not preclude arbitration. As
the Court noted, Uber drivers are similar to consumers in their lack of
bargaining power.4"
It is possible that the reach of this case is limited by its particular
facts. The arbitration costs are significant and must be paid up-front.
Further, the arbitration must take place in the Netherlands under the law
of the Netherlands. The Court used these facts to distinguish this case
from Kanitz.41 The Court also noted that Uber is well positioned to absorb
the up-front costs.42 Therefore, on a narrow reading of the decision, the
discrepancy between the up-front costs and the size of the claims appear
to be a driving force, along with the foreign location and laws. This could
limit the precedential value of the decision to arbitration clauses involving
similarly obvious signs of unfairness.
2.

On a broadreading, the Courts reasoningapplies to class actions
generally
Whether the Court of Appeal would hold an arbitration clause
unconscionable where costs are not an issue (i.e., costs are covered by
the powerful party) and the arbitration takes place in the claimant's
local jurisdiction is unclear. In other words, what if the principal sign of
unfairness is that arbitration clauses preclude class actions? The Supreme
Court has been clear that class action legislation creates a procedural
right, whereas arbitration clauses create a substantive right.43 Class action

39. See generally Yuki Noguchi, "Freelanced: The Rise of the Contract Workforce," National
Public Radio (22 January 2018), online: <www.npr.org/2018/01/22/578825135/rise-of-the-contract-

workers-work-is-different-now> [perma.cc/5NLC-LVN7]. There is conflicting data on this issue, in
part because it is somewhat difficult to collect and characterize. See, e.g., Ben Casselman, "Maybe the
Gig Economy Isn't Reshaping Work After All," The New York Times (7 June 2018), online: <www.

nytimes.com/2018/06/07/business/economy/work-gig-economy.html>
40.
41.
42.
43.

[perma.cc RX43-XBFB].

Heller,supra note 2 at para 71.
Ibidatpara72.
Ibid at para 68.
Bisaillon v Concordia University, 2006 SCC 19 atpara 17; Dell, supra note 11 atparas 106-108.
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legislation does not establish a substantive right to pursue a class action
and therefore does not preclude an arbitration clause.
This line of reasoning allows powerful parties to include mandatory
arbitration clauses in their standard form contracts and therefore prevent
class action claims. In Griffin v. Dell CanadaInc., while deciding whether
non-consumer claims should be stayed or remain joined with consumer
claims, Sharpe J.A. of the Ontario Court of Appeal wrote: "[t]he choice is
not between arbitration and class proceeding; the real choice is between
clothing Dell with immunity from liability for defective goods sold to nonconsumers and giving those purchasers the same day in court afforded to
consumers by way of the class proceeding."44 The Supreme Court recently
dismissed Sharpe J.A.'s reasoning in Wellman. As already mentioned,
the Court held that policy considerations should not be used to extend
the legislature's intent.45 The Court referred to Heller while pointing
out that arguments about unfairness should be made under the doctrine
of unconscionability. However, this is obiter since no unconscionability
arguments were made in Wellman.46 While Wellman continues the
traditional approach of upholding arbitration clauses in the absence of
clear legislative direction, it suggests that the Supreme Court is open to
unconscionability arguments.
Under a broad reading of Heller, the reasoning is that the excessive
costs of arbitration, location, and choice of law raise significant fairness
concerns because it is unreasonable to expect anybody to take Uber to
arbitration. The same reasoning applies to low-value claims in general
because it is unreasonable to expect individual claims to be made. There
is evidence to suggest that arbitration is significantly underused relative
to court actions, particularly for low-value claims." Also, arbitration
costs can be significant, as they are in this case.4" In other words, if it is
unreasonable to have up-front costs and a foreign location, it is similarly
unreasonable to expect anyone to bring low-value claims individually.
This is as true for class actions as it is for arbitration. The main advantage

44. 2010 ONCA29 at para 57.
45. Supra note 28 at paras 77-80.
46. Ibid at para 85.
47. See generally Cynthia Estlund, "The Black Hole of Mandatory Arbitration" (2018) 96 NCL Rev
679. See also Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, "Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the
Deck of Justice," The New York Times (31 October 2015), online: <www.nytimes.com/2015/ 1/01/
business/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html>
[perma.cc/MCC3PSCY]. ("The Times found that between 2010 and 2014, only 505 consumers went to arbitration over
a dispute of $2,500 or less.")
48. See, e.g., Public Citizen, "The Costs ofArbitration" (Executive Summary, 2002), online: <www.
citizen org/media/public-citizen-publications-costs-arbitration> [perma.cc/N7EG-FZWW].
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of class actions is the ability to group large numbers of small claims, thus
converting a low-value claim that could never be pursued to one of many
that, collectively, can feasibly be pursued.
In practice, by removing the ability to file a class action, the mandatory
arbitration clause effectively eliminates liability for the powerful party. It
does this by preventing individuals from bringing what would otherwise be
independent small claims in concert with others in similar circumstances.
If the only practical recourse for low-value claims is through class actions,
then arbitration clauses prevent any dispute resolution. By this reasoning,
these clauses are substantively unfair. Therefore, the reasoning from Heller
can be used to hold that arbitration clauses are unconscionable because
they preclude class actions, particularly where there are low-value claims.
If the reasoning does not apply to class actions involving a collection
of small claims, then companies can simply draft ostensibly generous
arbitration agreements (e.g., local venue, local laws, costs covered) to preempt unconscionability claims and avoid class actions.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court has shown a clear deference to legislatures to determine
when arbitration clauses are not enforceable. However, there have not been
any legislative changes in over a decade. The Court generally takes this to
mean that the legislative intent is for arbitration clauses to be upheld. On
the other hand, it may be that this issue has simply fallen by the wayside
in recent years. Regardless, the Court's position on arbitration clauses
has created a vacuum because of the lack of legislative response to the
apparent unfairness experienced by vulnerable parties who are bound to
arbitration clauses through standard form contracts.
The Ontario Court of Appeal's decision in Heller represents a
possible shift within the arbitration clause jurisprudence in Canada. The
decision can be interpreted two ways. On a narrow reading, Heller does
not significantly alter the position in Seidel due to the particular facts that
led to the unconscionability holding. Otherwise, the unconscionability
reasoning from Heller can apply more generally to arbitration clauses that
prevent low-value claims from being brought in a class action.
It is possible to build upon Seidel without creating a substantive
right to class actions, by holding that some categories of arbitration
clauses are unconscionable. One option is to establish factors within an
existing unconscionability test that determine when an arbitration clause
is unfair. Another is to create a specific test for unconscionability of
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mandatory arbitration clauses.49 Either of these would provide a measure
of predictability for businesses while protecting the rights of vulnerable
parties. Uber has filed leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.5

49. See, e.g., Discover Bank v Superior Court, 36 Cal 4th 148, 30 Cal Rptr 3d 76 (Sup Ct 2005).
The California Supreme Court in Discover Bank established a test for the unconscionability of class
waiver clauses in consumer contracts: 1) contract of adhesion, 2) disputes that are likely to involve
small amounts of money, and 3) a scheme by the stronger party to deliberately cheat large numbers
consumers out of. Note that this test was overturned by the US Supreme Court inAT&TMobiltyLLCv
Concepcion, 563 US 333, 131 S Ct 1740 (2011). This test was also mentionedby the Supreme Court of
Canada in Seidel. However, the Court did not address whether class action waivers are unconscionable
because the class waiver clause could not be separated from the invalid arbitration clause. See Seidel,
supra note 1 at para 45.
50. Supreme Court of Canada, Docket 38534, online: <www.scc-csc.ca/case-dossier/info/dock-regieng.aspx?cas=38534> [perma.cc/GU2W-8F95].

